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compose the employer-employee relationship, Section 8(c), by placing blinders
upon the Board, has hindered its effectiveness in translating the guarantee of
uncoerced elections into reality. Regardless of whether the courts permit con-
tinued broad use of the Board's weaker sanction, the Taft-Hartley Act has
done much to destroy the value of the NLRB's skill in accurately appraising
employer speech.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR COMMERCIAL
INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS"
THE venerable doctrine of sovereign immunity affords an inviting sanctu-
ary for foreign countries seeking to exempt their state trading organizations
from liability in the courts of other nations. While no canon of international
law dictates that any such exemption be proffered,' sovereigns themselves have
been accorded immunity since the early days when an insult to a king was a
potential casus belli.2 The same considerations of comity and diplomatic
expediency have influenced all nations to expand this originally personal
privilege to "governmental" activities of foreign states.8 Most European na-
tions go no further, denying immunity to "proprietary" activities.
4
dicator of the number of certification elections and hence of the opportunities for interfer-
ence with free choice, rose 2.5%b in the New England states, 48.6o in the South Atlantic
region, and 70% in the East South Central states. Id. The average increase in both utn-
fair practice and representation cases for all Regional Offices in 1947 was 21.6%. The
increase in southern offices was much higher. E.g., Baltimore: up 50.5%, Atlanta: up
60.2%; New Orleans: up 76.2%. Id. at 70.
* Lorina v. The Rossia (file no. 18767). Complaint dismissed without opinion by
District Court, Eastern District of New York on April 6, 1948.
1. The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812). A sovereign has a right to immunity
only before the courts of his own state. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN C. 18 (Oakeshott cd.
1946); AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENcE 336 (5th ed. 1885); Weston, Actions Against the Prop-
erty of Sovereigns, 32 HARv. L. REv. 266, 270 (1919).
2. Traditionally, sovereign immunity was extended only to (1) the person of a
foreign sovereign or head of state; (2) the person of an ambassador or other public
minister; and (3) a foreign army or warship. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 151-2
(5th ed., Phillipson, 1916) ; see The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 137-40 (1812). The per-
sonal aspect of immunity still persists. E.g., Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q.B.
149 (breach of promise suit against Sultan dismissed).
3. See Friedmann, The Growth of State Control over the Indizidual, and its Effect
upon the Rules of International State Responsibility, 19 BRIT. Y. B. INT L L. 118 (1938).
4. This limitation is enforced in the courts of Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Roumanla,
Austria, Greece, Egypt and France. ALLEN, THE PosITI N or FOREIGN STATEs nrroi,
NATIONAL CoURTs 31 (1933).
France first utilized this standard to curtail immunity in Gostorg et U.R.S.S. c. Associ-
ation France-Export, Cour d'Appel de Paris 1926, DALLOZ, RECUEIL HEIDOMADAIti 56
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But in the United States immunity, although not without restriction, is
granted more freely. While usually denied to government enterprises or-
ganized in corporate form,5 it is accorded to other commercial instrumentali-
ties such as trading ships even though these would come within the category
of "proprietary" activities. This liberal grant, in which competing private
enterprises cannot share, directly aids the instrumentalities of foreign states
at the expense of injured citizens who are thus deprived of judicial recourse.0
In an era of increasing socialism abroad, re-examination of the present policy
of the United States toward granting immunity may be in order.
The recent libel of the Russian ship Rossia by an injured passenger7 serves
to illustrate that policy in operation. Upon the institution of suit, the Soviet
Ambassador officially presented a claim of immunity to the State Department,8
asserting that the ship was owned by the Soviet Ministry of Marine Fleet.
The State Department, basing its decision on criteria laid down in previous
judicial opinions, "recognized and allowed" the claim.2 The court, basing its
decision on the State Department's recognition, dismissed the suit without
further inquiry.10
The Rossia case indicates, paradoxically, that responsibility for the immunity
policy of the United States rests primarily with the State Department, while
explanation of that policy must be found largely in judicial doctrine. With
increasing regularity the State Department has assumed the burden of de-
(1927), apparently in order to render Russian trading organizations subject to liability.
It is still uncertain whether France would apply this rule to the instrumentalities of
other countries. AumEN, op. cit. supra, at 171-4.
Great Britain is one of the few European countries which have never adopted the
restriction. E.g., The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197 (13,0) ; The Porto Alexandre, [1920]
P. 30; The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485. See Reisenfield, Soz'ereign Imintmity for Forcfgn
Vessels in Anglo-American; La w, 25 M INN. L. REv. 1, 7 et seq. (1940). The Netherlands
is another exception. ALLaN, op. cit. supra, at 147.
5. See notes 24-6 infra.
6. See Gould Coupler Co. v. U.S.S.B.E.F.C., 261 Fed. 716, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1919):
"The immunity of the sovereign may well become a serious injustice to the citizen, if it
can be claimed in the multitude of cases arising from governmental activities which are
increasing so fast."; Lord Maugham's opinion in The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485 at 521:
"Is it consistent with sovereign dignity to acquire a tramp steamer and to compete with
ordinary trading ships in the markets of the world? Doing so, is it consistent to set up
the immunity of a sovereign if, owing to the want of sLill of captain and crew, serious
damage is caused to the ship of another country?"
7. Lorina v. The Rossia (file no. 18767). Complaint dismissed without opinion by
District Court, Eastern District of New York on April 6, 194S.
8. This method is the accepted alternative to appearance in court by an official
representative to claim immunity as a bar to judicial proceedings. Ex Porte Muir, 254
U.S. 522, 532 (1921).
9. In a press release on the Rossia case, the State Department stated that recognition
of the claim was based on judicial "decisions dating back to 1926." N.Y. Times, April 10,
1948, p. 29, col. 3.
10. The libel portion of a companion case, Suhl v. M/V Rossia and the Amtorg
Trading Corp. (file no. 18762), was also dismissed. See note 23 infra.
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termining the validity of claims for immunity and its "suggestions" are ac-
cepted without hesitation by the courts." Prior to World War II, it is true,
the department usually preferred merely to forward the claim to the courts
for decision. 12 And even now, judges are occasionally required to decide a
claim independently because it is first presented in the judicial proceeding",
or because the State Department may still transmit it to the court without
recommendation. 14 Nevertheless, the judiciary has never seriously questioned
the paramount authority of the State Department in this field.1'
11. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); see United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
209 (1882) ; Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945). But cf. footnote 15 infra.
For a statement as to the general lack of competence of courts in cases affecting
international relations, see Mr. Justice Black, concurring in Z. & F. Assets Realization
Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 490 (1941). Judicial abstention is considered particularly
appropriate in cases involving sovereign immunity. See, e.g., The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367,
368 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) : "[I]f we do not approve of [state trading] . . . then we must say
so through diplomatic channels and not through the judiciary. Otherwise the judiciary
are really contributing to what might become, under conceivable circumstances, a casus
belli."
This judicial deference to the State Department has been defended on the one hand as
being an accommodation to "diplomatic necessity", Note, 50 YALE L. J. 1088, 1093 (1941),
JAFFE, JUDICIAL AsPEcrs OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 77-8 (1933), and attacked on the other
as overextending the power of the State Department, Jessup, Has the Suprene Court
Abdicated One of its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
12. E.g., Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E.2d 81 (1939); Hannes
v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st
Dep't 1940), 50 YALE L. J. 1088 (1941) ; see Desk, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and
the N. Y. Court of Appeals, 40 COL. L. R.v. 453 (1940).
In 1921 the State Department asserted that it "has made it a practice to refrain from
taking any action ... in private litigation even though such litigation may involve mer-
chant vessels owned by [a] foreign government." Letter from Undersecretary of State
to Portugese Minister, Nov. 23, 1921, quoted in 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 438 (1941). It does not appear that the State Department actually notified a court
that it "recognized and allowed" a claim made in behalf of a commercial instrumen-
tality until ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). In 1931 a claim made for a Dominican
ship was recognized, but evidently this recognition was never transmitted to the court.
2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra at 446 (The Arminda).
13. The government, at its discretion, may first present the claim in court through an
official representative instead of submitting it to the State Department. E.r pare Muir,
254 U.S. 522, 532 (1921). Where the facts of the case were in dispute, the State Depart-
ment refused even to forward the claim to the court, advising the foreign ambassador to
appear in the suit and present it. 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 12, at 449-50 (The
Naveinar, 1936) and at 455-6 (The San Ricardo, 1938).
14. See note 12 spra.
15. Only once has the court ignored a State Department determination. In Berlizzi
Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), the Supreme Court recognized a claim which
had been specifically denied. But the Supreme Court was never so cavalier where the
State Department had granted immunity. And in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35
(1945), the Court indicated that a State Department suggestion would never again be
rejected, regardless of whether it granted or denied the claim. Moreover, it asserted that
determinations which the judiciary was forced to make would be based exclusively on
grounds which the State Department had previously approved. The opinion of the court
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But because the State Department has asserted its reliance on judicial de-
cisions, even if such reliance is not compelled, and because courts themselves
must on occasion decide claims independently, these decisions continue to be
the only explicit basis for the present United States immunity policy. Thus
where a ship, such as the Rossia, is involved, the primary requirement for im-
munity is possession of the vessel by a foreign government.1 Until 1926, a
showing that the ship was employed for a "public purpose" was also required.r
But in Berifzi Bros. v. The Pesaro8 the Supreme Court held that state efforts
at economic advancement constituted as much of a public purpose as, for ex-
ample, the maintainance of a naval force.10 This conclusion in effect places
every government-controlled ship in public service regardless of the nature of
its activity.20
That corporations owned by foreign governments have not been similarly
favored2 ' seems the result of applying a legal fiction rather than a realistic dis-
tinction. Although these agencies have escaped when courts have found them
indistinguishable from the government itself,"2 liability has usually been im-
disowned only the judicial independence asserted in the Berizzi case; the doctrine of im-
munity there enunciated still stands. See p. 179 infra.
16. The requirement is "actual possession by some act of physical dominion ... or at
least some recognition on the part of the ship's officers that they were controlling the vessel
and crew in behalf of the government." The Navemar, 303 U.S. 6S, 75-6 (1933). This
must have occurred prior to the libelling of the vessel. The Katingo Hadjipateram, 40
F.Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 119 F2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1941). The "possession"
test has been criticized as being an insufficient criterion. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 at 39-40 (1945); Sanborn, The Immurity
of Gozernmzent-Owned Merchant Vessels, 39 Ax.- J. INT'L L. 794 (1945).
17. The criteria of "possession" and "public purpose" were first applied to a foreign
vessel in Long v. The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1R3) (libel of Mexican
ship). The basis for that decision had earlier been established in cases involving federal
or state-owned ships or cargoes, id. at 494-5, the area in which U.S. law as to govern-
mental immunities was first developed. See Reisenfield, supra note 4, at 36.
18. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
19. This conclusion had previously been reached in four lower federal court cases.
The Pampa, 245 Fed. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) ; The Maipo, 252 Fed. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) ;
The Afaipo, 259 Fed. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); The Carlo Poma, 259 Fed. 39 (2d Cir.
1919), rev'd on Jurisdictional grounds, 255 U.S. 219 (1921). Contra: The Pesaro, 277
Fed. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). All of these ships except the Pesaro were to carry a govern-
ment cargo of supplies or munitions on the return voyage, although this possible ground
for distinction was not considered in The Maipo, *52 Fed. 627. Despite these decisions
the Supreme Court had continued to insist that immunity for ships engaged in trade
was an open question. See, e.g., Ex parte: In the Matter of the State of New York,
256 U.S. 503 (1921).
20. As a result, courts may ignore the "public purpose!' requirement completely.
E.g., Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 193S). But at times they still pay lip
service to it. See The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938).
21. The law concerning these entities, as with ships (see note 17 .sara), is derived
primarily from cases involving instrumentalities of the United States. See cases cited in
United States v. Deutches Ialisyndilmt Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
22. On this ground courts have granted immunity to railroad corporations. De.xter
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posed by one of three rationales, all of which treat the corporations as a sep-
arate entity not entitled to the protection accorded to a foreign state.23 Most
frequently courts have reiterated the logic of Chief Justice Marshall that
"when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. '24 On other occasions, courts
have held that by using the corporate device the state has chosen an instru-
mentality which can sue and be sued as a separate entity.25 A third rationale
may be that since the suit is nominally against the corporation rather than the
government, it is not proper to "pierce the corporate veil" to determine
whether the stock is in fact owned by the state. 26
While this fiction-formed policy as to corporations does reduce the number
of instances in which suit by an injured party is barred, a more inclusive
restriction which would also deny immunity in cases like The Rossia seems
desirable in order to protect private interests more adequately. One method
of achieving that result is the prevalent European practice of limiting the
privilege to activities which are governmental rather than proprietary.27
This traditional distinction however, has proven far too uncertain even as a
& Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930) (since the cor-
poration and "the government of Sweden are one and the same," immunity should be
granted); Bradford v. Dir. Gen. of Railroads of Mexico, 278 S.W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) (since railroad is operated by agency of government, suit is against the state
itself) ; Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876 (1908) (suit
is "virtually against the king of a foreign country").
On two occasions the State Department, with consequent acquiescence by the courts,
has recognized and allowed the immunity of a Mexican corporation operating expropri-
ated oil fields. Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944), reaff'd 294
N.Y. 265, 62 N.E.2d 64 (1945); F.W. Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanog,
352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945). Courts have not, as yet, extended immunity this far in
the absence of a "suggestion" from the State Department.
23. It was undoubtedly because of this doctrine that plaintiff in Suhi v. M/V
Rossia and the Amtorg Trading Corp., supra note 10, joined Amtorg, alleging that the
Soviet corporation had an interest in the Rossia "as owner, agent, or operator." Had
there been any merit to the allegation, the action could probably have been continued
against Amtorg even though the libel of the Rossia was dismissed. However, it was
subsequently dropped by plaintiff.
24. Bank of U.S. v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (1824). This
rationale has been adopted in cases such as United States v. Deutches Kalisyndikat
Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (French potash cartel), and Ulen v. Bank
Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y. S.2d 201 (2nd Dep't 1940)
(Polish bank).
25. E.g., Coale v. Socit6 Co-op Suisse des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(Swiss coal importing corporation).
26. Cf. Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
27. See note 4 supra. A few United States decisions seem to approach this doctrine.
Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y. S.2d
825 (1st Dep't 1940) (corporation formed to "exploit certain monopolies, issue bonds,
and float loans") ; cf. Briggs v. Light-Boats, 11 Allen 157 (Mass. 1865) ; E.r parle: In
the Matter of the State of New York, 256 U.S. 503 (1921).
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standard for the domestic problem of municipal corporation liability.2  In
an international context, such a criterion encounters the added complication
that concepts of what constitutes a "governmental" function are different in
various countries.2 9 A more precise method, though still involving problems
of classification, would be to impose liability upon the state for damages re-
sulting from any commercial activities in which it engages.30  By looling to
the nature of the activity rather than to formalistic categories, this standard
would, in effect, equate the status of governments, insofar as they engage in
trade, with the ordinary business enterprise.31
While this change in policy would obviously be decried by socialist coun-
tries, several factors make it unlikely that they would resort to retaliatory ac-
tion. Economic repercussions do not seem probable in view of the importance
of trade with this country for the rest of the world. And many nations, Great
Britain being the most significant exception, have already imposed similar
limitations on the scope of immunity so that the proposed change would ap-
proximate their longstanding practice. 2  Moreover, the United States per-
mits its own government corporations and non-military vessels to be sued in
federal courts.33
28. See 6 McQuiLL N, M UNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS § 293 (2d ed., 1923). For ex-
ample, courts cannot even agree on the question of whether operating public parks is
"governmental" or "proprietary." Id. § 2850.
29. See Friedmann, supra note 3, at 128. For an example of how two countries may
differ in classifying the same type of transaction, compare Kingdom of Roumania v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 250 Fed. 341 (2d Cir. 1918) (purchase of military supplies
declared a sovereign function) uith Stato di Rumania c. Trutta, I Monitore dei Tribunali
288 (1926) (nature of contract to buy military supplies held "extraneous to the exercise
of sovereignty"), translated in 26 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 627-9 (1932).
30. This principle was first proposed in 1S91 by the Institut de Droit International.
Sco'r, REsoLuTIoNs OF THE INSTTuTE OF INTERNATIoNAL LAw 91-2 (1916). It is also
embodied in Article 11 of a suggested Draft Convention of the Competence of Courts
in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 451, 597 et seq. (1932), providing
for liability of all types of government owned instrumentalities engaged in trade; and
for commercial ships and their cargoes in The Brussels Convention of 1926, U.S. Dmr.
oF STATE TREATY INFO. Buu.m No. 18 (Mlarch, 1931) 67, which has been ratified by a
few European nations.
31. Increased liability, of course, emphasizes the intricate collateral problem of how
judgments can be executed against a foreign sovereign. For possible solutions see Draft
Convention of the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Mx. J. IT.'VL
L. Supp. 451, 689-725 (1932); Note, 31 CoL L. REv. 660 (1931).
32. See note 4 supra.
33. E.g., The Suits in Admiralty Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
88741-52 (1946), provides for the liability of merchant vessels or tugboats oved or
in the possession of the United States or any corporation whose stock it ovms, if suit is
brought in United States courts. Liability is similarly provided for any corporation
which may be created under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, Pub. L No. 472, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., § 104(d) (April 3, 1948). Cf. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 STAT.
842-847, 28 U.S.C. h- 921-946 (1946) which allows suit against the United States for
injuries resulting from both commercial and non-commercial activities, although claims
arising in a foreign country are excepted.
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While the diplomatically desirable method of promulgating such a restric-
tion would be an international convention, the trend towards govern-
ment ownership in Europe makes widespread approval of increased liabil-
ity improbable at this time.8 4 But neither legal nor diplomatic considerations
preclude unilateral action by the United States.85 Courts might make clear
that they adhere to their previous doctrines merely because compelled to ac-
cede to the State Department; and to the extent that these doctrines are the
only explanation for our present policy, the State Department can repudiate
them.
Nor does the possibility that present policy might be founded instead on
political expediency change the conclusion that, in the interest of private rights,
immunity should be limited. Compared with other diplomatic devices, such
as control of ERP funds, power to manipulate the grant of immunity seems
relatively unimportant. Moreover, in the past suits against corporations
owned by foreign governments have been allowed with no adverse diplomatic
results in spite of vigorous claims of immunity.80
To reformulate United States policy two techniques are available: the State
Department could issue a forthright statement that future claims of immunity
for commercial instrumentalities will not be "recognized and allowed," or
Congress could enact legislation setting up a general standard which would
preclude recognition of such claims. A declaration would be the most direct
method of accomplishing the change. But, since a mere declaration is easily
modified, it may not be sufficient in itself to curtail expedient decisions
significantly. If diplomatic pressures were allowed to force an ad hoc
grant of immunity to one nation despite the declaration, it would then be
difficult to deny that privilege to any friendly nation. By its relative inflex-
ibility, legislation would obviate this difficulty. And Congressional action
should diminish the possibility that an international incident might arise from
an unsuccessful claim by unequivocally forewarning foreign nations that at-
tempts to exert diplomatic pressure in behalf of claims of immunity for state
trading organizations will be unavailing.
Against a background of increasing governmental trading activities, the
broad grant of immunity accorded by the United States seems unduly liberal.
Whether by State Department action or by legislation, sovereign immunity
should be restricted to permit private parties to recover from government
owned commercial instrumentalities.
34. Several existing conventions contain provisions' concerning the liability of
states, but none of these is widely applied today. See note 30 .rupra, and the summary
of earlier maritime conventions in REPORT OF T E Commi'rE or EXPERTS FOR TIE PRO-
GRESSIVE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF GovERNMENT
SHips EMPLOYED IN COMMERCE, (League of Nations Publications V: Legal No. c. 52
M. 29) (1926).
35. The only requirement of international comity is that whenever the criteria of
immunity are modified, foreign governments be notified "in a manner not to be mnsunder-
stood." The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, 146 (1812).
36. See notes 24, 25 ,upra.
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